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Art Law: Looking Back, Looking Forward 
By Christine Steiner and Bee-Seon Keum* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Consider The Thomas Crown Affair, the Hollywood hit about 
a clever attempt by burglars to break into the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art in New York City. The movie has all the drama of 
Art Law writ large and, indeed, it seems that the art market is 
now pure entertainment or spectator sport. Art law has grown 
into a recognized area of law—taught in many law schools and 
practiced by a select group of visual arts lawyers who represent 
artists, collectors, auction houses, museums, galleries, and other 
players in the “art world.” 
It should be noted that Art Law is a misnomer; it is not a 
field unto itself, but rather it is a multi-disciplinary practice 
requiring extensive knowledge of diverse substantive areas of the 
law—contracts, torts, real property, tax, trusts and estates, 
criminal law, intellectual property, commercial law, international 
business transactions, civil procedure, and more—combined 
with experience in the business practices of the arcane fine 
arts industry. 
This young field is changing rapidly. Even late in the last 
century, most business was done on a handshake. The few 
players were known to one another in the art centers of New 
York, London, or Paris, the transactions were smaller, the stakes 
were lower, and lawsuits were relatively rare. As we discuss 
below, the handshake norms of these cozy circles proved 
outmoded as sales became global, the sophisticated collector base 
expanded, museums became bigger in size and number, 
commercial galleries proliferated, and auction houses hammered 
down record sales.  
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served as assistant general counsel for Smithsonian Institution and as general counsel for 
The J. Paul Getty Trust, including the Getty Museum. She teaches Art Law at Loyola 
Law School. Bee-Seon Keum is an associate with Withers Bergman LLP. Her practice 
focuses on tax matters and transactions, including purchases, loans, consignments, 
Section 1031 like-kind exchanges, and charitable donations of art. The authors express 
their gratitude to Diana Wierbicki, Global Head of Art Law at Withers Bergman LLP, for 
her guidance in this article. 
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The legal issues in this area can be vexing, with 
cross-jurisdictional, multi-party opaque transactions challenging 
every aspect of a practitioner’s creativity and knowledge. The 
authors are privileged to practice in a firm which built its art law 
practice with Ralph Lerner and Judith Bresler, authors of Art 
Law: A Guide for Collectors, Investors, Dealers and Artists, the 
pioneering work in the field, first published in 1989.1 The work, 
now in its fourth edition, remains the last word on all aspects of 
the practice of art law, including gallery sales, private sales, 
artist-dealer relations, auctions, authenticity, international 
issues, impairments of title, First Amendment, copyright, moral 
rights of artists, tax and estate planning for collectors and artists, 
museum issues, and a host of other legal considerations. The 
treatise also includes art-related legislation and model agreements. 
This field garners great attention from the media and the 
public, largely because the high-profile cases are intriguing—stolen 
art, fakes and forgeries, wartime crimes, antitrust conspiracies, 
archeological riches—indeed the compelling stuff of blockbuster 
movies. Even yeoman legal issues such as contracts, tax, and 
copyright are worthy of attention because, quite simply, art 
matters. This Article will look back to the origins of art law, trace 
the legislative and regulatory developments of the evolving field, 
and look forward to the expected maturation of the practice. 
II. ORIGINS OF ART LAW AND ITS CURRENT STATE 
Much of the body of law that governs commercial 
transactions developed out of civil litigation involving disputes 
between artists, dealers, collectors, and other stakeholders in the 
art industry. As noted above, and as seen through case law, a 
wide range of preexisting disciplines, including commercial law, 
contract law, and tort law have provided the foundations for art 
law related to commercial transactions. 
A. The Uniform Commercial Code 
The Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) is the most 
important collection of statutes that applies to purchases and 
sales of art.2 Article 2 of the UCC, which deals with the sale of 
goods, is the principal source for the rules regarding authenticity 
and title, two of the most important issues from both a buyer and 
 
 1 See generally RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR 
COLLECTORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, & ARTISTS (4th ed. 2012). 
 2 See id. at 87–88. 
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a seller’s perspective. To date, forty-nine states have adopted 
Article 2 of the UCC.3 
Title and authenticity are particular concerns in an art sale 
because infirmities in either can have detrimental consequences 
for the marketability of the artwork. The buyer must be assured 
that the seller is the owner of the work and has the ability to 
transfer good and marketable title to the work, free and clear of 
all claims; the buyer must have free and unencumbered right of 
possession and enjoyment of the work. The buyer must also be 
assured that the work is authentic and that it is what the seller 
represents—typically that it is by a particular artist and/or from 
a particular country of origin, period, or culture. The seller, on 
the other hand, will want to be very careful about the 
representations and warranties he or she is making regarding 
the work so as not to be vulnerable to a breach of warranty claim. 
Fortunately, Article 2 of the UCC provides the framework for the 
rules governing authenticity and title transfer. 
1. Authenticity 
Authenticity is governed by the warranty provisions of 
Article 2, consisting of the express warranty, the implied 
warranty of merchantability, and the implied warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose.4 Express warranties arise from 
affirmative statements made by a seller regarding the goods. 
UCC Section 2-313 provides that:  
(1)  Express warranties by the seller are created as follows:  
(a)  Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer 
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain 
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the 
affirmation or promise.  
(b)  Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to 
the description.  
(c)  Any sample or model which is made part of the basis of the 
bargain creates an express warranty that the whole of the goods shall 
conform to the sample or model.  
(2)  It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the 
seller use formal words such as “warrant” or “guarantee” or that he 
have a specific intention to make a warranty, but an affirmation 
merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be 
 
 3 See Uniform Commercial Code Locator, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/ 
uniform/ucc#a2 [http://perma.cc/7UQF-5SRT]. The State of Louisiana has adopted several 
Articles of the UCC, but not Article 2. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:1-101 to 10:9-710 (2016). 
 4 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 88–101. 
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merely the seller’s opinion or commendation of the goods does not 
create a warranty.5  
Thus, a seller’s affirmation of fact or promise that a work is 
by a particular artist, or the seller’s description of the work as 
being by a particular artist will create an express warranty if 
such affirmation or description by the seller becomes part of the 
basis of the bargain. As can be seen in Weber v. Peck, an express 
warranty by a seller’s description of the work can include a 
seller’s statements about the provenance of a work if the buyer 
relies on such statements.6  
In Weber, the plaintiff, Francis Weber, entered into a 
contract with the defendant, an art dealer, to buy a Jacob van 
Ruisdael painting for $388,000 plus 5% of the proceeds from the 
resale of the painting.7 In the contract, the art dealer agreed to 
provide original authenticating letters from Ruisdael experts. 
The parties also signed a bill of sale in which the art dealer 
warranted that “the above described painting is authentic and as 
described above.”8 The applicable description of the painting 
included a reference to the painting’s provenance. Although 
the art dealer did not provide the original authenticating 
letters at the closing, Weber proceeded with the purchase and 
subsequently moved forward with placing the painting for sale at 
an upcoming auction at Sotheby’s. In the course of that auction 
consignment, Weber learned that Sotheby’s was unable to verify 
the provenance of the painting and thus deleted value-enhancing 
references to seven previous owners and five publications. Weber 
sued the art dealer after the Sotheby’s sale did not go well; a bid 
was made for $300,000 but payment was never received and 
Weber retained the work. Weber’s suit alleged that, having sold 
at auction, the painting could not be placed again in the 
aftermarket and could not be sold for more than $300,000. Citing 
to New York’s UCC 2-313(1)(b), the court ruled in favor of Weber 
on the breach of warranty issue, concluding that the art dealer 
had breached his warranty of the accuracy of the provenance.9 
 
 5 U.C.C. § 2-313 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). 
 6 See id. at 90–91; Weber v. Peck, No. 97 Civ. 7625(JSM), 1999 WL 493383, at *3 
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1999). The term “provenance” derives from the French provenire, 
meaning “to originate.” The provenance of a work of art “is the historical record of its 
ownership” and is related to but distinguishable from authenticity, which for practical 
purposes means that a work is by a particular artist; provenance “can bolster claims of a 
work’s authenticity,” as records of an object’s presence in a particular collection or in the 
artist’s purported workshop can provide strong evidence of a work’s authenticity. 
Provenance Guide, INT’L FOUND. ART RES., https://www.ifar.org/provenance_guide.php 
[http://perma.cc/NQ4A-7XUN]. 
 7 Weber, 1999 WL 493383, at *1. 
 8 Id. at *1. 
 9 Id. at *4. 
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The court did not allow Weber to rescind the entire sale because 
Weber knew the authenticating letters were not provided at the 
closing and proceeded anyway with the subsequent Sotheby’s 
sale. However, the court noted that Weber was not precluded 
from seeking damages for breach of the warranty related to the 
provenance or the alleged breach of warranty of the 
authentication letters. Such damages would depend on the extent 
to which the loss in value was caused by the breach.  
In addition to express warranties, authenticity issues can 
also fall within the ambit of implied warranties, which are 
warranties that arise from the circumstances or conduct of the 
sale and not from the express statement of a seller.10 The two 
types of implied warranties are that of merchantability and 
fitness for a particular purpose.11 The application of implied 
warranties to artwork seems to be an imperfect fit, because the 
language of the implied warranties suggests that they are 
intended to cover the sale of fungible goods.12 A buyer of a forgery 
may nevertheless seek to avail himself or herself of these 
remedies against the art merchant who sold the forgery.13  
UCC Section 2-314(1) provides that, unless excluded or 
modified, “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is 
implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with 
respect to goods of that kind.”14 The term “merchant” is defined 
as “a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his 
occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill 
peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction.”15 
In the art context, “merchant” includes commercial art galleries, 
auction houses, and art dealers, but does not include individual 
collectors who are not in the business of buying and selling art.16 
The relevant provisions of UCC Section 2-314(2) provide that, to 
be merchantable, goods must at least “pass without objection in 
the trade under the contract description,” be “fit for the ordinary 
purposes for which such goods are used,” and “conform to the 
promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or label if 
any.”17 Thus, arguably, a forgery sold by an art merchant would 
not pass muster under UCC Section 2-314(2) with regards to the 
 
 10 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 98. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 U.C.C. § 2-314(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). Although the UCC 
allows implied warranties to be disclaimed, disclaimers are valid only under proscribed 
circumstances. See U.C.C. § 2-316 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). 
 15 U.C.C. § 2-104(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). 
 16 LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 99. 
 17 U.C.C. § 2-314(2)(a), (c), (f) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). 
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description of the work specified in the agreement of sale or 
fitness for the ordinary use for such work.18 
UCC Section 2-315 provides as follows: 
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any 
particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the 
buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select or furnish 
suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next 
section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.19 
Thus, arguably, a forgery would fail to satisfy UCC Section 
2-315 if the seller knew of the buyer’s purpose in buying the 
artwork (e.g., to purchase an authentic painting by a particular 
artist), the seller has knowledge that the buyer is relying on the 
seller’s skill or judgment in furnishing the artwork (e.g., the 
seller is an art merchant), and the buyer actually relies to his or 
her detriment on the seller’s skill.  
2. Title 
Article 2 of the UCC provides substantial protections for a 
buyer against the risk of bad title.20 UCC Sections 2-312(1) and 
(2) provide as follows: 
(1)  Subject to subsection (2) there is in a contract for sale a warranty 
by the seller that 
(a)  the title conveyed shall be good, and its transfer rightful; and 
(b)  the goods shall be delivered free from any security interest or 
other lien or encumbrance of which the buyer at the time of 
contracting has no knowledge. 
(2)  A warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only 
by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer reason 
to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself or that 
he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third person 
may have.21 
Thus, unless specifically excluded or modified, every contract 
for the sale of art includes a warranty stating that the seller is 
transferring good title, the seller has the right to transfer title, 
and the works are transferred free of security interests, liens or 
other encumbrances of which the buyer has no knowledge.22 
Additionally, UCC Section 2-312(3) provides that if the seller 
is a merchant, there is an implied warranty that the seller 
 
 18 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 99. 
 19 U.C.C. § 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). 
 20 See id. at 103. 
 21 U.C.C. § 2-312(1) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). 
 22 Id. 
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delivers the goods free from “the rightful claim of any third 
person by way of infringement.”23  
The case of Menzel v. List determined the appropriate 
amount of damages owed to a purchaser if a seller did not pass 
good title for the painting to the purchaser.24 Erna Menzel and 
her husband had purchased a Chagall painting at auction in 
Belgium in 1932 for what was then the equivalent of $150. In 
1940, the Menzels fled Belgium ahead of the Nazis, leaving the 
painting in their apartment. When the Menzels returned to their 
apartment in 1946, they discovered that the painting was 
confiscated and a receipt was left in its place. The painting 
resurfaced in 1955 when a Parisian art gallery sold it to the 
noted New York dealer Klaus Perls for $2800. A few months 
later, Perls resold the painting to Albert List for $4000. In 1962, 
Mrs. Menzel recognized the painting in an art book mentioning 
List as the owner, and she sued List to recover the painting. List, 
in turn, impleaded Perls for breach of an implied warranty of 
title.25 At trial, the jury directed List to return the painting or 
pay Mrs. Menzel for the painting’s then-fair market value of 
$22,500 and found for List as against Perls in the amount of 
$22,500.26 The appellate court reduced the amount of damages to 
$4000 plus interest, but the Court of Appeals reversed, 
reinstating the award of $22,500 to List. The Court of Appeals 
reasoned that List was entitled to his benefit of the bargain, 
which was the fair market value of the painting at the time of its 
return to Mrs. Menzel, rather than rescission, which would have 
given List only his purchase price plus interest. Commentators 
have noted that, by putting List back in the position he would 
have been in had Perls not breached the implied warranty of 
title, the Court of Appeals placed the full burden of investigation 
 
 23 U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2016). 
 24 See id. at 104–05; Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969). 
 25 LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 104–05. At the time the case was decided, 
sales in New York were governed by the New York equivalent of the Uniform Sales Act 
instead of the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 13 of the Uniform Sales Act provided 
as follows: 
In a contract to sell or a sale, unless contrary intention appears, there is (1) an 
implied warranty on the part of the seller that . . . he has a right to sell the 
goods . . . (2) an implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet 
possession of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the time of 
the sale. 
Menzel, 246 N.E. 2d at 744. 
 26 Although statute of limitations was not at issue in Menzel v. List, a buyer with a 
breach of warranty claim in New York must meet a four-year statute of limitations. See 
Doss, Inc. v. Christie's, Inc., No. 08 Civ. 10577 (LAP), 2009 WL 3053713, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 23, 2009) (noting that New York law requires commencement of a buyer's claim for 
breach of warranty within four years of delivery of the goods). 
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of title to the painting squarely on the dealer.27 The result in a 
breach of warranty of title claim, that a seller bears liability for 
the increase in value, can indeed be an expensive remedy in the 
hothouse environment of art valuation.28 
B. Tort Law 
The explosive growth of the art market in recent years and 
the staggering sums that works of art can command have led to 
increased concerns about forgeries. In cases of forgery, tort law 
may provide recourse to the aggrieved buyer in addition to 
contract law’s breach of warranty claims.29 The injured buyer 
may claim that the seller committed the tort of fraud, which 
occurs when the seller has made an intentional or knowing 
misrepresentation of a material existing fact about the artwork 
with the intention that the misrepresentation be relied on and 
the buyer in fact relies on such misrepresentation to his or her 
detriment.30 The buyer might also claim that the seller engaged 
in negligent misrepresentation, which, unlike fraud, does not 
require the seller’s intent or knowledge of the misinterpretation.31  
The torts of fraud and negligent misrepresentation are not 
mutually exclusive from breach of warranty claims, and buyers 
asserting forgery claims against an art dealer may include one or 
both of the tort claims as well as breach of warranty claims. A 
recent forgery case in which the plaintiffs asserted a number of 
claims, including fraud and breach of warranty, is one of several 
actions filed against Knoedler Gallery and its principals.32 In 
2011, the venerable Knoedler Gallery, New York’s then-oldest 
commercial art gallery, shocked the art world by abruptly closing 
its doors after 165 years, following allegations that it had sold 
approximately $80 million worth of forged Abstract Expressionist 
paintings over the course of a decade, including works attributed 
to Rothko, de Kooning, Pollock, Motherwell, and other great 
artists of the mid-twentieth century. Plaintiffs, in a spate of 
lawsuits, alleged that Knoedler misrepresented material facts 
in presenting the origin and provenance of the works, that 
 
 27 See, e.g., Patty Gerstenblith, Picture Imperfect: Attempted Regulation of the Art 
Market, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 501, 525 (1988); Deborah A. DeMott, Artful Good Faith: 
An Essay on Law, Custom, and Intermediaries in Art Markets, 62 DUKE L.J. 607, 624 (2012).  
 28 See Gerstenblith, supra note 27, at 525–26; DeMott, supra note 27, at 619.  
 29 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 137. 
 30 Id. The required elements for a claim for fraud consist of “(1) misrepresentation of 
a material fact; (2) the falsity of that misrepresentation; (3) scienter, or intent to defraud; 
(4) reasonable reliance on that representation; and (5) damage caused by such reliance.” 
Kottler v. Deutsche Bank, 607 F. Supp. 2d 447, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 31 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 138. 
 32 De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, 137 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
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Knoedler’s statements regarding the origin and provenance of the 
works were false, that Knoedler had an intent to defraud, that 
plaintiffs reasonably relied on Knoedler’s misrepresentations, 
and that plaintiffs incurred damage as a result of relying on 
Knoedler’s misrepresentations. The cases against Knoedler 
ultimately settled out of court without completing trial, resolved by 
payment of refunds or settlements of enhanced monetary amounts. 
The lessons from the Knoedler scandal should be apparent to 
any reasonable art professional seeking to avoid an authenticity 
dispute—in an unregulated industry with confidential 
transactions on behalf of undisclosed principals, due diligence is 
especially important. But how much diligence is due? At a 
minimum, an individual seeking to purchase, or a dealer seeking 
to sell, should obtain expert assurances as to authenticity and 
explore all “red flags.” In the Knoedler cases, these “red flags” 
included: a secret overseas collector with works that had never 
been publicly exhibited and had no known provenance; and sales 
transacted by intermediaries previously unknown in the art 
world, at prices below-market, and at times with payments in 
cash. Buyer beware. 
C. Art-Specific Legislation 
Until the 1960s, the art market remained largely 
unregulated by any statutory scheme directed solely at the 
buying and selling of fine art.33 Artwork was merely treated as 
personal property, and the few issues dealing with artwork were 
resolved through litigation in the courts under existing bodies of 
law.34 At the state level, the status quo changed in New York in 
1965 when a series of public hearings were held to discuss issues 
unique to the art market, and as a result, several new laws were 
added in 1966 to the New York General Business Law aimed to 
address the rights of artists and consumers.35 Since then, 
legislation specifically addressing art issues has experienced 
rapid growth in several states, including New York, California, 
Massachusetts, and others.36 At the federal level, there are laws 
addressing the protection of art of specific classes (such as Native 
Americans),37 of certain objects (such as those incorporating parts 
 
 33 See Leslie Kaufman Akst, Regulation of the New York Art Market: Has the 
Legislature Painted Dealers into a Corner?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 939, 939 (1978). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. 939 nn.3 & 5.  
 36 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 145; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1738, 
1738.5–38.9 (West 2016); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 715B.2–715B.4 (West 2016); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 104A, § 2 (West 2016); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 442.321–42.325 (West 
2016); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 1.01–61.13 (McKinney 2016). 
 37 See, e.g., Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”), 
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derived from endangered species, e.g., ivory),38 or of legal 
systems (such as international treaties governing cultural 
property).39 In totality, state and federal legislation relating to 
the art market covers a broad spectrum of issues addressing 
the protection of consumers, artists, the market place, and 
cultural property in general.  
1. Consumer and Artist Protection Laws  
As the largest U.S. commercial center of art activity, New 
York has developed the most significant regulatory body of law 
governing art. In 1983, the Arts and Cultural Affairs Law 
(“NYACAL”) was enacted, replacing most of the new articles that 
were added to the New York General Business Law governing 
the rights of artist and consumers.40  
Notably, with respect to consumer protection, the NYACAL 
provides a lay purchaser with stronger warranty protections than 
those available under Article 2 of the UCC. Section 13.01 of the 
NYACAL provides: 
1.  Whenever an art merchant, in selling or exchanging a work of fine 
art, furnishes to a buyer of such work who is not an art merchant a 
certificate of authenticity or any similar written instrument it: 
(a) Shall be presumed to be part of the basis of the bargain; and 
(b) Shall create an express warranty for the material facts stated as of 
the date of such sale or exchange.41 
Thus, if an art merchant provides a writing to a purchaser 
with a description that the artwork was created by a specific 
artist, such as an invoice, an express warranty is created.42 
Effectively, the provision removes the distinction between 
objective fact and the art merchant’s mere opinion with respect to 
authenticity.43 The intention behind this fact/opinion provision 
was to level the playing field for laypersons dealing with art 
merchants, acknowledging that dealers may be incentivized to 
 
25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 (2016); Importation of Pre-Columbian Monumental or Architectural 
Sculpture or Murals, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2091–95 (2016). 
 38 See Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2016). 
 39 See, e.g., UNESCO Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention 1954, May 
14, 1954; UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit 
Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970; UNESCO 
Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 
16, 1972. 
 40 The Arts and Cultural Affairs Law was enacted as new Chapter 11-C of the 
Consolidated Laws of New York by Arts & Cultural Affairs Law, ch. 876, 1983 II. N.Y. 
Laws 2462, effective Dec. 31, 1983.  
 41 Id. at § 13.01. 
 42 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 90. 
 43 Id. at 146. 
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affix a definite attribution to a work in order to inflate the price 
and, in case of misattribution, to rely on the defense that the 
attribution was a mere opinion.44  
The NYACAL also provides strong protections for the artist 
in artist-dealer relationships. Section 12.01(1)(a) of the NYACAL 
provides that whenever an artist delivers an artwork to an art 
merchant for the purpose of exhibition and/or a sale, the delivery 
to and acceptance of such artwork creates a consignor/consignee 
relationship.45 The art merchant will be deemed to be an agent of 
the consignor-artist with respect to the artwork, the artwork is 
considered trust property for the benefit of the consignor-artist, 
and any proceeds from the sale of such artwork are trust funds 
for the benefit of the consignor-artist. The trust property and 
trust funds shall be considered property held in statutory trust, 
and no such trust property or trust funds shall become the 
property of the consignee or be subject or subordinate to any 
claims, liens, or security interest of the consignee’s creditors. 
This statute means, among other things, that the artist must be 
paid first and that the artist’s consigned works cannot be 
attached in a bankruptcy action. Section 12.01(3) provides a 
strong enforcement mechanism by allowing attorney’s fees for 
plaintiffs who successfully enforce their rights in court. 
Moreover, any waivers must be clear, conspicuous, and in 
writing. Notably, much of Section 12.01 was strengthened in 
direct response to the scandalous collapse in 2007 of the Salander 
O’Reilly Gallery, another seemingly reputable New York gallery 
that was charged with fraud for selling works to multiple parties, 
selling works without disclosing such sales to the consignors, and 
converting such sales proceeds to pay off existing gallery debts.46 
2. Object Protection Laws 
Various laws protecting goods in commerce have been 
enacted at the federal level to address the protection of art. 
For instance, the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act (“NAGPRA”) was passed in 1990 to restore 
tribal ownership of Native American grave goods and human 
remains.47 The statute requires federal agencies and museums 
receiving federal funds and holding Native American remains or 
objects to publish written summaries of the items and consult 
 
 44 See Levin v. Dalva Brothers, Inc., 459 F.3d 68, 77 (1st Cir. 2006).  
 45 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 21. 
 46 NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS’N, REPORT ON LEGISLATION BY THE ART LAW COMMITTEE 
2–3 (2012), http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072122-ReportonA7189S4988re 
NewYorkArtsandCulturalAffairsLawNYACAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/322L-59CL]. 
 47 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001–13 (2016). 
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with the tribe affiliated with the remains or object to determine 
and agree on the repatriation and disposition of the remains or 
objects. The statute also protects Native American burial sites 
and the removal of Native American human remains and 
imposes criminal penalties for trafficking in Native American 
human remains. 
A federal law that has recently significantly impacted the art 
and antiquities market is the Endangered Species Act of 1973 
(“ESA”),48 and especially the regulations governing African 
elephants under the ESA. First, a bit of background: in the 
United States, the African elephant is primarily protected and 
managed under the Convention on International Trade of 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”) and the 
ESA.49 CITES, which took effect on July 1, 1975, is a multilateral 
treaty signed by 182 parties, including the United States, for the 
protection of certain listed animal and plant species.50 CITES 
regulates commercial and noncommercial international trade in 
listed species through a system of permits and certificates that 
must be obtained for import and export.51 With the exception of 
certain populations of African elephants that are deemed to be 
recovering populations, all other African elephants are listed in 
Appendix I, which lists species that are threatened with 
extinction and are or may be affected by trade and therefore 
subject to “particularly strict regulation.”52  
The ESA, which implements CITES in the United States, 
prohibits the taking, possessing, selling, offering for sale in 
interstate or foreign commerce, importing, exporting, delivering, 
carrying, transporting, or shipping in the course of a commercial 
activity, any ESA species listed as “endangered” or any part 
thereof.53 While the ESA does not specify particular prohibitions 
 
 48 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. (2016). 
 49 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2016); Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087; 16 U.S.C. §§ 4201–22 
(2016) African elephants are also protected under the African Elephant Conservation Act, 
which was passed in 1988 and imposes a moratorium on the import of African elephant 
ivory since 1989. This moratorium, still in place, makes it illegal to import raw African 
elephant ivory into the U.S. from any country unless certain conditions are met. Id. 
 50 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 81 Fed. Reg. 36,388 (June 6, 
2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/06/06/ 
2016-13173/endangered-and-threatened-wildlife-and-plants-revision-of-the-section-4d-rule-for- 
the-african#h-11 [http://perma.cc/HZ4E-4FZU]. 
 51 Id. at 36,389. 
 52 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora art. II, July 1, 1975, 27 U.S.T. 1087. 
 53 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 81 Fed. Reg. 36,388 (June 6, 
2016) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17), https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2016/06/06/ 
2016-13173/endangered-and-threatened-wildlife-and-plants-revision-of-the-section-4d-
rule-for-the-african#h-11 [http://perma.cc/HZ4E-4FZU]. 
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for ESA species listed as “threatened,” the Secretary of the 
Interior (“Secretary”), acting through the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, has the authority to issue protective regulations for 
species under Section 4(d) of the ESA.54 The African elephant has 
been listed as a “threatened” species under the ESA since June 
11, 1978, and regulations were issued by the Secretary under 
Section 4(d) to regulate the import and commerce of African 
elephant ivory with certain exceptions.55 Notably, the ESA allows 
an “antiques exception” for articles that: (a) are not less than 100 
years of age; (b) are composed in whole or in part of any endangered 
species or threatened species; (c) have not been repaired or modified 
on or after December 28, 1973; and (d) entered at a port designated 
for the import of ESA antiques.56 
On July 6, 2016, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service issued 
final regulations increasing protection for African elephants and 
resulting in a near-total ban on the commercial trade in African 
elephant ivory in the United States.57 For commercial purposes, 
the import of African elephant ivory is prohibited.58 For 
noncommercial purposes, the import of worked elephant ivory is 
allowed if it was legally acquired, removed from the wild prior to 
February 26, 1976, and is either part of a household move or 
inheritance, part of a musical instrument, or part of a traveling 
exhibition.59 For commercial purposes, only the export of items 
meeting the ESA antiques exception is allowed. For noncommercial 
purposes, only the following exports are allowed: (a) items meeting 
the ESA antiques exception; (b) items legally acquired, removed 
from the wild prior to February 26, 1976, and are either part of a 
household move or inheritance, part of a musical instrument, or 
part of a traveling exhibition; (c) certain worked ivory that 
qualifies as pre-ESA; and (d) law enforcement and bona fide 
scientific specimens.60 Interstate and foreign commerce in 
African elephant ivory is prohibited except for items that qualify 
as ESA antiques, and certain manufactured or handcrafted items 
that contain a small (de minimis) amount of ivory and meet 
certain criteria.61 Notably, “foreign commerce,” i.e. selling ivory 
outside of the United States—as distinguished from import or 
export—by persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction is prohibited with 
limited exceptions for ESA antiques and manufactured or 
 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 36,390. 
 56 Id. at 36,388. 
 57 Id. at 36,418. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.  
 61 Id.  
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handcrafted items that contain a de minimis amount of ivory.62 
Interstate commerce, i.e. selling across state lines, is only 
allowed for items meeting the antiques exemption and certain 
manufactured or handcrafted items that contain a de minimis 
amount of ivory.63 Intrastate commerce, i.e. selling within a 
state, is allowed for: (a) ivory lawfully imported prior to January 
18, 1990, the date the African elephant was listed in CITES 
Appendix I, which the seller must demonstrate; or (b) ivory 
imported under a CITES pre-convention certificate, which the 
seller must demonstrate.64 Noncommercial movement within the 
United States, within and across states, of legally acquired ivory 
is allowed. The personal possession and noncommercial use of 
legally acquired ivory is also allowed. 
As demonstrated above, laws protecting art in commerce 
present challenging and complex issues due to the difficulty of 
balancing freedom of commerce against the need to protect 
threatened or endangered species or classes of art objects. 
Interestingly, the response by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
to comments received from the U.S. museum community during 
the comment period for the final regulation on African elephants 
suggests that there may be further consideration of how 
museums are treated under the final regulation, and further 
developments can be expected in this evolving area.65 
3. Moral Rights Laws 
Legislative initiatives to protect artists and their works also 
took hold in the latter twentieth century. In 1990, Congress 
passed the Visual Artists’ Rights Act (“VARA”),66 giving artists 
new rights in their works, rights of attribution, and rights of 
integrity, that are related to, but distinct from, copyright. VARA 
protects artistic works from intentional destruction or mutilation 
and requires that works be properly credited to the creator. 
Significantly, VARA defines “a work of art” subject to protection 
for the first time in the definitional section of the Act, which states: 
A “work of visual art” is — 
(1)  a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a single copy, 
in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and 
consecutively numbered by the author, or, in the case of a sculpture, 
in multiple cast, carved, or fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that 
 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 See id. at 36,397. 
 66 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2016). 
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are consecutively numbered by the author and bear the signature or 
other identifying mark of the author; or 
(2)  a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, 
existing in a single copy that is signed by the author, or in a limited 
edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively 
numbered by the author. 67 
Some states had artists’ rights protections in place prior to the 
passage of VARA—see, e.g., California (1979), New York (1983)—and 
in some cases these state statutes provide broader rights.68  
In addition, California recognizes a resale royalty right, and 
is the only state in the nation to accord a royalty to the artist 
when an artwork is resold.69 The royalty right, like the rights of 
attribution and integrity, derive from the European model of 
artists’ rights. The California Resale Royalty Act (“CRRA”), 
provides, essentially, that where a sale of fine art for at least 
$1000 takes place on the secondary market in California, the 
artist is entitled to receive 5% of the resale price from the seller 
within ninety days of the sale.70 The constitutionality of the 
statute was challenged in a series of lawsuits in 2012 and 2015 
and its status is uncertain.71 As this Article goes to press, the 
Ninth Circuit is expected to rule shortly on the issue of 
preemption, i.e. whether the Copyright Act of 1976 preempts the 
state CRRA statute. 
D. Intellectual Property 
1. Overview 
The field of copyright is an especially active one in the art 
world because intellectual property rights—particularly 
copyright and trademark—have a direct bearing on the creation 
and marketing of fine art. Artists create original works and, at 
the same time, they often use works created by others; museums 
own collections, sell products, and license their names for 
reproductions of objects and images. Those in the arts are 
concerned about protecting ownership rights, while at the same 
 
 67 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2016). 
 68 See CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 42-116s–116t (2016) (enacted in 1988); 815 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 320/1–8 (2016) (enacted in 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2154–5126 (West 2016) 
(enacted in 1986); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 27 § 303 (2016) (enacted in 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 231, § 85S (2016) (enacted in 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-1–8 (West 2016) 
(enacted in 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-1–3 (2016) (enacted in 1978); N.Y. ARTS & 
CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.01–14.03 (McKinney 2016) (enacted in 1984); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 
2101–10 (2016) (enacted in 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-75.2-1–10 (2016) (enacted in 1987). 
 69 CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West 2016). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th Cir. 2015). 
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time concerned about protecting and preserving fair use and 
access to works in the public domain because creativity thrives in 
a vibrant and massive public domain. A working knowledge of 
the basic principles of intellectual property is essential in the 
field, and the rapid advance of communication technologies and 
the resulting demand for content have focused even greater 
attention on intellectual property issues.  
Copyright and trademark are different concepts, protecting 
different types of property through different enforcement 
mechanisms. Copyright is described as a “bundle of property 
rights.”72 The law states that copyright protection subsists “in 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can 
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated.”73 It 
grants exclusive rights to copyright owners and curbs those 
exclusive rights with certain limitations (most importantly, fair 
use) that further the public interest. A trademark is the exclusive 
right to use the objective symbol signifying the goods and 
services offered in commerce by the owner. Trademark principles 
raise certain procedural issues—distinctiveness, relevant 
market, likelihood of confusion, types of marks, prior use—that 
are peculiar to the commercial arena. This overview will focus on 
copyright, rather than trademark, because copyright is the more 
common (and urgent) focus of creative communities. 
For a work to be protected by copyright, it must be fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression, so that the object can be 
perceived, reproduced, or expressed for more than a brief 
duration. It must be original and contain an expression of the 
author’s creativity. The amount of originality or creativity needed 
to pass the threshold is not high; so, for example, a change in 
color or medium is not enough originality or creativity to pass the 
threshold, but a change in angle or light might be. Copyright 
protects expressions, but not ideas, procedures, processes, systems, 
methods of operations, concepts, principles, or discoveries. Many 
of the interesting copyright cases are art cases, whether they 
involve a sculpture based on a photograph;74 a movie poster based 
on a magazine cover;75 a new photograph appropriating the 
underlying photograph;76 the ownership of the copyright in a 
commissioned work;77 and a host of other art-related cases. 
 
 72 United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274, 283 (2002). 
 73 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2016).  
 74 Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 75 Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 708–09 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 76 Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 77 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). 
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2. Fair Use 
Fair use, which is an equitable doctrine that balances the 
rights of a copyright owner with the rights of society, speaks to 
specific uses of protected works that are considered “fair.” The 
tension between an owner’s financial and security interests and 
society’s legitimate access to intellectual property led Congress to 
incorporate and codify a growing body of fair use case law when 
it revised the Copyright Act in 1976.78 Fair use strives to ensure 
that an author’s exclusive bundle of property rights will not 
hinder the very creativity the law was designed to foster. The 
doctrine recognizes that new works draw inspiration from older 
works and that the productive use of older works promotes the 
progress of science, art, and literature. Fair use permits certain 
good-faith uses that, in other contexts, would be infringement. 
These uses include criticism, comment, new reporting, teaching, 
scholarship, and research.79 
The fair use statute lays out the test to determine whether a 
use is fair. The fair use test is a four-pronged, case-specific 
analysis. It examines: (1) the purpose and character of the new 
work’s use; (2) the nature of the original work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the original 
work as a whole; and (4) the economic effect on the original 
work’s actual and potential markets.80 These prongs cannot be 
evaluated in isolation as a mathematical formulation, but rather 
the test is a “totality of the circumstances” analysis. The 
flexibility inherent in the test often leaves users unsure whether 
the contemplated use is a fair use. The lawyer’s classic answer, 
“it depends,” is particularly unhelpful to those seeking certainty 
in assessing these fine-line distinctions. 
Art-related decisions dominate the fair use case law, and 
with good reason, because artists are entitled to fair use of the 
copyrighted work of others, and equally entitled to vigorously 
enforce their exclusive rights to exploit their properties by license 
or other means. Fair use in the context of objects and images is 
often in the eye of the beholder; one must determine and apply 
the fair use test, with all its nuances and inconsistencies. The 
one overriding question in the fair use assessment is whether a 
use is transformative or productive; does the new work 
encompass valuable creativity in and of itself? When a work has 
been transformed, there is less likelihood of market substitution 
and more likelihood of a fair use finding. This was illustrated in 
 
 78 See generally The Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976). 
 79 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2016). 
 80 Id. 
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the 1994 case Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc.,81 where the 
alteration of the lyrics from “Pretty Woman” was held to be 
possible fair use because the new song, by 2 Live Crew, featured 
lyrics that were substantially different from the original Roy 
Orbison song, targeted a different audience, and posed little risk 
of market substitution. Likening the song to a modern-day 
parody that made commentary on the original, the Supreme 
Court found that the use was productive and offered a separate 
new value. 
While a new work is more likely to pass the fair use test if 
the new work’s composition, message, and use differ from those 
of the copyrighted work, it can be difficult in the realm of images 
to assess the degree of transformation or productivity needed to 
satisfy the fair use test. In Rogers v. Koons, the court found that 
a Jeff Koons sculpture, which reproduced in sculptural form a 
copyrighted photograph by Ed Rogers, was not a fair or 
transformative use because it added no separate creativity and 
affected the market for the photograph.82 In Hart v. Sampley, the 
sale of items containing the copyrighted image of the Three 
Servicemen statue at the Vietnam Veterans Memorial was found 
not to be a fair use.83 However, in Wojnarowicz v. American 
Family Association, the publication of fragments of a work in an 
anti-National Endowment for the Arts pamphlet was found to be 
a fair use because the portion used was insubstantial, and the 
free speech implications were significant (note, though, that the 
artist prevailed under an integrity clause of the New York moral 
rights statute, the Artists’ Authorship Rights Act).84 
Fair use has inherent drawbacks; it is expensive and time 
consuming to make individualized decisions on a case-by-case 
reading of the facts, and it is risky because the analysis might be 
incorrect. Fortunately, fair use is not an either/or proposition; 
rights management systems exist for situations where fair use is 
inapplicable or impractical, for large-scale projects, and for peace 
of mind. 
3. Online Issues 
The growth of the internet has been accompanied by a liberal 
interpretation of both freedom of speech and of the fair use 
 
 81 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589–600 (1994). Though the 
Court held that 2 Live Crew “departed markedly from the Orbison lyrics and produced 
otherwise distinctive music,” the Court did not make a determination on the issue of 
whether the use of the original song’s bass riff was “excessive copying”; instead, the case 
was remanded “to permit evaluation of the amount taken.” Id. at 570. 
 82 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 313 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 83 Hart v. Sampley, No. 91-3068, 1992 WL 100135, at *2–3 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 1992). 
 84 See Wojnarowicz v. Am. Family Ass’n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 141 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
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exception. The ease and speed of downloading and manipulating 
images, and the mass of unrestricted images on the internet, 
have lulled many users into assuming implied licenses to copy, 
print, and distribute internet materials. Uploading an image 
implicates the rights of reproduction and distribution; 
downloading and printing an image represent two acts of 
reproduction; and modifying an image implicates the rights of 
reproduction, distribution, and adaptation. If the use is a fair 
use, these activities will not infringe the copyright owner’s 
exclusive rights. But if these uses are deemed not to be fair, then 
each separate act is a separate (presumably compensable) 
infringement.85 Interesting issues in the online environment 
include whether a digital image differs enough from an original 
image to garner its own copyright; whether a reproduction of a 
work in the public domain is eligible for copyright when it is 
digitized; how to deconstruct the separate copyright components 
of a multimedia project; and who is liable for third-party 
infringement. It can be expected that there will be many 
developments in this area in the future. 
E. Tax 
As art escalates in value, collectors increasingly treat their 
art collections as investments. The art collection as investment 
property presents unique and challenging issues from various tax 
perspectives, including income tax and gift and estate taxes. 
1. Income Tax Treatment of Art  
The rising value of art has led to the necessity of tax 
planning from an income tax perspective. The income tax 
treatment related to artwork will have different income tax 
results depending on whether the owner of the artwork is treated 
as a dealer, investor, or collector.86 A dealer is someone who is 
engaged in the trade or business of selling art to customers. 
Although the term “trade or business” is not defined in the 
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”), case law has stated that the 
taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and 
regularity, and the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in 
the activity must be for income or profit.87 A sporadic activity, 
which the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) classifies as a hobby, 
 
 85 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (West 2016); see also FAQs: Copyright and Digital Files, 
COPYRIGHT, https://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-digital.html#backup [http://perma.cc/ 
D9G9-C5SG]. 
 86 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 1169–71. 
 87 Comm’r v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987). 
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amusement, or diversion, does not qualify.88 Dealers are taxed on 
the gain from the sale of art held as inventory at ordinary income 
tax rates and may take income tax deductions for ordinary and 
necessary expenses incurred in the trade or business of being a 
dealer.89 An investor is someone who buys and sells art primarily 
for investment purposes, rather than for personal use and 
enjoyment or as a trade or business. As distinguished from a 
dealer who holds art as inventory in a business, an investor holds 
art for the primary objective of making a profit from the 
appreciation in value of the art over a period of time.90 
Investors are taxed on the gain from the sale of art held for 
more than one year at the federal long-term capital gains rate 
for collectibles, which is currently 28%.91 Investors are much 
more restricted than dealers in their ability to take deductions 
for investment-related expenses, as they can only deduct 
expenses incurred in connection with holding property for the 
production of income.92 A collector is someone who buys and sells 
art primarily for personal pleasure and is not a dealer or 
investor. Collectors, like investors, are taxed on the gain from 
the sale of art held for more than one year at the current 
federal long-term capital gains rate for collectibles of 28%.93 
Collectors have even more limitations on their ability to deduct 
collection-related expenses than investors.94 
Distinguishing between dealers, investors, and collectors is 
often not an easy task because of the element of personal 
enjoyment inherent in any artwork and the facts and 
circumstances of the inquiry. Investors face a particularly difficult 
task in proving that they are holding artwork primarily for 
investment purposes and not for personal use and enjoyment. 
While deriving pleasure may not in and of itself preclude finding 
that a collection is investment property, the collector will find it a 
challenge to convince the IRS of his or her investor status if the 
activities and circumstances indicate that there is too much 
enjoyment of the collection without the requisite demonstrated 
intent to treat the collection as investment property.95 
 
 88 Id. 
 89 See I.R.C. §§ 1(a)(2), 64, 162 (2016). The top ordinary income tax rate is currently 
39.6%. Id. 
 90 See Drummond v. Comm’r, 73 T.C.M. (CCH) 1959, at *10–11 (1997). 
 91 I.R.C. § 1(h)(1) (2016). Art held for one year or less is taxed at ordinary income 
rates. Id. 
 92 Examples of investment-related expenses that an art investor may choose to 
deduct include insurance premiums, storage fees, and subscriptions to trade publications. 
See Wrightsman v. United States, 428 F.2d. 1316, 1319 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
 93 I.R.C. § 1(h)(4) (2016). 
 94 See I.R.C. §§ 68(a) & 183(b) (2016). 
 95 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 1172–73; Wrightsman, 428 F.2d. at 1320. 
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2. Section 1031 Like-Kind Exchanges 
For art owners who do qualify as investors for income tax 
purposes, like-kind exchanges under IRC Section 1031 may 
provide a capital gains tax deferral opportunity (we refer to such 
exchange as a “Section 1031 like-kind exchange”).96 IRC Section 
1031 allows owners of investment properties to defer payment of 
capital gains taxes by reinvesting proceeds from the sale of a 
currently owned property into the purchase of a new like-kind 
property.97 The property exchanged must be property held for 
productive use in a trade or investment that is exchanged solely 
for property of a “like kind” to be held for productive use in a 
trade or business or for investment.98 The property exchanged 
cannot be stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale 
(i.e. inventory).99 Therefore, generally with regard to artwork, 
taxpayers who are eligible to take advantage of Section 1031 
like-kind exchanges will be investors who hold artwork primarily 
for investment, as opposed to collectors who collect artwork for 
personal enjoyment.  
Section 1031 like-kind exchanges involving artwork present 
an interesting mix of issues because there are gray areas 
alongside clear-cut rules. On the one hand, the rules are highly 
technical. For instance, the Treasury Regulations for IRC Section 
1031 provide detailed rules for certain specific timing 
requirements in so-called “deferred exchanges.”100 On the other 
hand, much is unsettled, such as what constitutes like-kind 
property in the context of art. The Treasury Regulations provide 
the following interpretation of the term “like-kind”:  
As used in section 1031(a), the words “like kind” have reference to the 
nature or character of the property and not to its grade or quality. One 
kind or class of property may not, under that section, be exchanged for 
property of a different kind or class. The fact that any real estate 
involved is improved or unimproved is not material, for that fact 
relates only to the grade or quality of the property and not to its kind 
or class.101 
How to distinguish between the “nature or character” of one 
kind of artwork for another is a question that remains a gray 
area. On the one hand, the IRS rulings on coins held for 
investment seem to focus on the function of the property held 
rather than the makeup of the property, as discussed below: 
 
 96 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 1187–90. 
 97 See I.R.C. § 1031 (2016). 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. 
 100 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(k)-1 (2008). 
 101 See Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-1(b) (1991). 
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 In Revenue Ruling 76-214, the IRS ruled that the exchange 
of Mexican 50-peso bullion-type gold coins for Austrian 
100-corona bullion-type gold coins qualified for nonrecognition 
of gain under IRC Section 1031.102 Since such coins were not 
circulating mediums of exchange in their respective countries, 
their nature or character were the same for purposes of IRC 
Section 1031 as being gold coins.  
 In Revenue Ruling 82-96, the IRS ruled that gold bullion was 
like-kind to Canadian Maple Leaf gold coins for purposes of 
IRC Section 1031.103 The Maple Leaf coins were traded for 
their gold content. Therefore, they were bullion-type coins 
whose nature and character were the same and thus of like 
kind with the gold bullion. 
 In Revenue Ruling 79-143, despite the coins appearing 
similar because they both contain gold, the IRS held that 
United States $20 gold coins for South African Krugerrand 
gold coins were not like-kind to each other.104 The U.S. gold 
coins were numismatic-type coins, the value of which is 
determined by their age, number minted, history, art and 
aesthetics, condition, and metal content, while the South 
African Krugerrand gold coins were bullion-type coins, the value 
of which is determined solely on the basis of metal content.  
 In Revenue Ruling 82-166, the IRS held that gold bullion 
coins and silver bullion coins were not like-kind to each other, 
not because one was gold and the other silver but because 
silver is essentially an industrial commodity and gold is 
primarily utilized as an investment in itself.105  
On the other hand, the IRS has ruled for purposes of IRC 
Section 1033, which governs the treatment of involuntary 
conversion of property, that lithographs are not “similar or 
related in service or use” to artwork in other media such as oil 
paintings, watercolors, sculptures, and other graphic forms of 
art.106 Although we do not know whether the same rationale 
would apply in the context of a Section 1031 like-kind exchange, 
the conservative approach would be to select works of the same 
media for a Section 1031 like-kind exchange.107 
 
 102 Rev. Rul. 76-214, 1976-1 C.B. 218. 
 103 Rev. Rul. 82-96, 1982-1 C.B. 113. 
 104 Rev. Rul. 79-143, 1979-1 C.B. 264. 
 105 Rev. Rul. 82-166, 1982-2 C.B. 190. 
 106 See LERNER & BRESLER, supra note 1, at 1188; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-27-089 
(Apr. 10, 1981). 
 107 In I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-27-089 (Apr. 10, 1981), a fire damaged an art collection 
consisting of 3000 lithographs, some oil paintings, pencil drawings, sculptures, masks, 
wood carvings and block prints. The taxpayers wanted to use the insurance proceeds to 
Do Not Delete 3/31/2017 5:04 PM 
2017] Art Law: Looking Back, Looking Forward 141 
3. Valuation Issues in Tax and Estate Planning with Art 
One of the key issues from a tax perspective is how to value 
artwork in a collection. Art is inherently unique and therefore it 
is difficult to find precise sale comparisons to determine value. 
Moreover, there are large information gaps when it comes to 
comparing the values of other similar artwork in the market. 
Only 47% of art sales worldwide are conducted through public 
auctions and the rest are private sales, the terms of which are 
often confidential and sometimes known only to the 
intermediaries transacting the sale.108 As such, the concept of 
“fair market value,” defined in the estate tax regulations as “the 
price which a willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, neither 
being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having 
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts,” is somewhat of a 
challenge as applied to art in practice.109 Nevertheless, the fair 
market valuation of art is necessary from all areas of tax, 
including income tax, gift tax, and estate tax. 
The IRS has developed comprehensive rules on the valuation 
of art in the income and gift and estate tax regulations.110 As 
contemplated by the IRS’ rules and procedures, the practice of 
valuing art for tax purposes relies heavily on the opinions of 
appraisers who are demonstrated to be experts in the property 
being appraised. For instance, to claim an income tax deduction 
for a charitable donation of artwork with a claimed value 
exceeding $5000, the taxpayer must obtain a “qualified 
appraisal” from a “qualified appraiser” for the property 
contributed.111 To be a “qualified appraisal,” an appraisal must 
be prepared by a qualified appraiser containing certain specific 
information about the artwork being contributed, including a 
detailed description of the property, a detailed description of the 
qualified appraiser’s background and qualifications, the method 
of valuation used to determine the fair market value, and the fee 
arrangement between the donor and the appraiser.112 A “qualified 
appraiser” is an individual who (i) has earned an appraisal 
 
purchase replacement works consisting of 63% lithographs and 37% works in other media 
such as oil paintings, watercolors, sculptures, or other graphic forms of art. The IRS ruled 
that, for purposes of IRC Section 1033, lithographs may not be replaced with artworks in 
non-lithograph artistic media and nonrecognition of gain was disallowed to the extent 
that 36% of the insurance proceeds were reinvested in art works in other artistic media. Id. 
 108 See Eileen Kinsella, What Does TEFAF 2016 Art Market Report Tell Us About The 
Global Art Trade?, ARTNET NEWS, (Mar. 9, 2016), https://news.artnet.com/market/tefaf-
2016-art-market-report-443615 [http://perma.cc/TZ78-6LWV]. 
 109 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6(a) (2011). 
 110 Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-6 (2011); Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1992); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-
1(c)(2) (2008). 
 111 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11) (2016); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(i)(A) (1996). 
 112 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c) (1996). 
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designation from a recognized professional appraiser organization, 
or has otherwise met minimum education and experience 
requirements set forth in the regulations; (ii) regularly performs 
appraisals for pay; and (iii) meets any other requirements 
prescribed by the IRS.113 The individual will not be treated as a 
qualified appraiser for a specific appraisal unless he or she 
demonstrates verifiable education and experience in valuing the 
property subject to the appraisal and the individual has not 
been prohibited from practicing before the IRS at any time for a 
three-year period ending on the appraisal date.114 Art valuations 
submitted to the IRS may be reviewed by the Art Advisory Panel 
of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.115 Created in 1968, the 
Art Advisory Panel is made up of art experts, including museum 
curators, dealers and scholars, serving without compensation.116 
As can be seen from recent annual reports, the Art Advisory Panel’s 
valuations often differ from those submitted by taxpayers.117  
Interesting valuation issues can arise when art is not owned 
in its entirety but rather in undivided fractional interests, 
particularly in the estate tax context. Although courts have upheld 
valuation discounts for the transfer of less than a 100% interest in 
artwork for estate tax purposes, this remains a developing area, as 
seen most recently in Estate of Elkins v. Commissioner.118 In 
Estate of Elkins, James Elkins and his children owned 
percentage interests in sixty-four works of modern and 
contemporary art as a result of lifetime gifts and transfers made 
under Mr. Elkins’s wife’s will.119 Upon Mr. Elkins’s death, the 
IRS denied the estate’s claim of a fractional ownership discount 
of 44.75% to the artwork, and litigation ensued.120 Rejecting the 
IRS’s argument that no discount should be allowed for fractional 
interests in works of art, the Tax Court allowed a nominal 10% 
fractional ownership discount to account for various 
“uncertainties” a hypothetical buyer of Mr. Elkins’s fractional 
 
 113 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(ii) (2016). See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(5) (1996) and I.R.S. 
Notice 2006-96, 2006-46 I.R.B. 902 for further IRS requirements for qualified appraisers. 
 114 I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E)(iii) (2016). 
 115 ART ADVISORY PANEL OF THE COMM’R OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ANNUAL SUMMARY 
REPORT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR 2015 2 (Sept. 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/art_adv_ 
panel_annual_summary_report_fy15.pdf [http://perma.cc/G4FX-CJPH]. 
 116 Id.  
 117 For example, in 2015, the Art Advisory Panel recommended acceptance of 35% 
and recommended adjustments of 65% of the appraisals reviewed. Id. at 4. 
 118 Estate of Elkins v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 86, 119 (2013), aff’d, 767 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 
2014); see also, Stone ex rel. Stone Trust Agreement v. United States, No. 07-17068, 2009 
WL 766497, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 24, 2009) (denying fractional interest discount for estate's 
interests in paintings, but allowing discount equal to estimated costs of partitioning 
estate's interest). 
 119 Elkins, 140 T.C. at 87–89. 
 120 Id. at 91–93. 
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interests in the art may face due to the children’s ownership of 
their fractional interests in the art.121 The Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit went even further in ruling for the estate, 
holding that because the IRS offered no evidence on the 
discounted values and nothing in the record supported the 
nominal 10% discount determined by the Tax Court, the estate’s 
expert opinions on the valuation issue must stand (including 
steep discounts of up to 80% on some individual pieces).122 Note 
that the Fifth Circuit accepted the estate’s discounted values 
based on the lack of evidence presented by the IRS, a mistake the 
IRS is not likely to repeat.123 As a final cautionary note, family 
entity planning with fractional interests in art may invite 
scrutiny from the IRS not only from an estate tax perspective but 
also from an income tax perspective, as seen in the recent case of 
Allbritton v. Commissioner, where the IRS asserted a $40.7 
million tax assessment on a family company that owned 
fractional interests in art that was rented out to the family for 
personal use.124 These cases illustrate the potential challenges 
that taxpayers may face with the IRS in cases involving movable 
and enjoyable assets such as art.125 It remains to be seen what 
approach the IRS will take in future cases and whether any 
methodologies will be proposed to provide guidance on the 
valuation of fractional interests in art.126 
III. CHANGING NORMS 
As can be seen from the above, the attention from legislative 
and regulatory bodies to the many aspects of the art world have 
created a complex web of interrelated and unrelated laws. An art 
law practitioner must know and employ a deep and wide 
command of the law, whether representing artists, collectors, 
galleries, museums, or others in the art market place. 
 
 121 Id. at 126, 135. 
 122 Elkins, 767 F.3d at 445. 
 123 See Diana Wierbicki, Elkins v. Commissioner, in LISI ESTATE PLANNING 
NEWSLETTER #2085 (Leimberg Information Services, Inc.) Apr. 1, 2013, at 8. 
 124 Complaint, Allbritton v. United States, No. 4:15-v-00275 (S.D. Tex. 2015). As of 
the date of this Article's publication, the case has been stayed pending settlement. 
 125 Diana Wierbicki & Bee-Seon Keum, Whose Art Is It Anyway?, WEALTHMANAGEMENT.COM 
(Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.wealthmanagement.com/estate-planning/whose-art-it-anyway 
[http://perma.cc/5CX4-AKAH]. 
 126 Proposed Regulations under IRC Section 2704 were issued on August 4, 2016 to 
limit valuation discounts for fractional interests in certain family-controlled entities for 
estate, gift, and generation-skipping transfer tax purposes. See Estate, Gift, and 
Generation-Skipping Transfer Taxes; Restrictions on Liquidation of an Interest, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 51413–25 (proposed Aug. 4, 2016). Public hearings were held on the proposed 
regulations on December 1, 2016.  
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Not only are the laws evolving, but the art world itself is 
evolving. The cozy circle of dealers and collectors, noted in the 
Introduction, has grown into a mega-industry. Many galleries 
have expanded globally, operating internationally as one gallery 
or as separate related subsidiaries. Art fairs now fill the annual 
calendar and galleries are expected to keep the business going at 
home while simultaneously setting up shop for a week in other 
cities, whether foreign or domestic. The time and expense, 
coupled with the challenges of international transport, assure 
that only the successful operators can participate. Moreover, 
collectors who enjoy these social/commercial events and welcome 
the opportunities to purchase at art fairs must confront a host of 
legal issues inherent in international purchasing—what is the 
situs of the sale?; what taxes are owed?; what are the remedies if 
things go wrong? 
Apart from international purchasing in the art fair context, 
the global nature of the art marketplace assures that these 
international transactions are becoming commonplace. For 
example: a lawyer representing a client in one country sells to a 
collector in another country; a collector/investor purchases a 
work strictly for investment and stores it indefinitely in a 
“freeport” such as the Geneva Freeport or Le Freeport in 
Singapore. Freeports can be generally described as zones 
allowing the suspension of taxes, customs, and other duties on 
goods within such zones. Historically, freeports were used as 
temporary storage facilities for goods on the move, and tax 
suspensions in these zones were intended to promote trade and 
commerce by lightening regulatory burdens that may slow down 
transactions.127 Today, freeports house—on an indefinite basis, if 
desired—some of the world’s most valuable art collections in 
state-of-the-art security facilities that employ art professionals 
and provide opportunities to transact business with the benefits 
of privacy and limited regulatory oversight.128 It should be noted 
that the tax suspension benefits of freeports are temporary, as 
they only “suspend” the requirement to pay taxes until the goods 
reach their final destinations, and once the goods leave the 
freeport, transfer taxes and customs duties may apply depending 
on the destination country’s tax and customs laws. Although 
regulatory attention has focused on the wealth stored in 
 
 127 See Uber-Warehouses for the Ultra-Rich, THE ECONOMIST (Nov. 23, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21590353-ever-more-wealth-being-parked-fancy-
storage-facilities-some-customers-they-are [http://perma.cc/Y4BK-C8R5]. 
 128 Id. 
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freeports, it remains to be seen whether these “safe havens” will 
be substantially challenged.129  
As transactions have become more complex (in value, 
geography, or otherwise), written agreements have become more 
standardized. Common terms include representations and 
warranties, payment and delivery, responsibility for expenses 
and taxes, insurance, consequences of default, termination, and a 
host of other clauses, depending on the nature of the transaction. 
And, as the Knoedler matter teaches us, dealers and collectors 
will exercise more caution in commercial transactions, especially 
those involving unknown or remote parties.130 
Perhaps the most significant shift in market practices can be 
seen in the areas of antiquities and objects of cultural patrimony. 
The late twentieth century and early twenty-first century saw a 
series of lawsuits demanding repatriation of cultural objects by 
nations of origin. These claims asserted that the objects were 
stolen property because they had been taken in violation of 
nations’ theft laws, or were taken in violation of valid treaties. 
Indeed, the illicit international trade in objects of cultural 
property, including archeological and ethnographic objects, has 
largely shifted as the ethics of collecting have been examined and 
revised. Gone are the days of wholescale plunder of archeological 
sites, causing destruction of the site as well as the context and, 
often, the objects themselves. Galleries and collectors now largely 
trade in properly documented, legitimately excavated, or acquired 
objects. Similarly, museums have changed practices and now are 
bound by ethics codes that prohibit acquisition of archeological 
materials and ancient art without valid title, evidence of lawful 
export, and a full history from discovery to the present.131 These 
ethical codes govern not only the acquisition, but also the 
borrowing, displaying, and disposing of such objects. It can be 
expected that these claims will continue to be prosecuted, and 
that newly-emerging nations will press repatriation claims for 
indigenous cultural property or for artistic works taken 
improperly in times of strife. 
At the same time claims were asserted for repatriation of 
cultural property, the latter twentieth century saw claims 
asserted by survivors and families of victims of the wholescale 
expropriation of art by the Nazis during the Holocaust-era. The 
 
 129 Id. 
 130 See generally De Sole v. Knoedler Gallery, 137 F. Supp. 3d 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 131 Guidelines on the Acquisition of Archaeological Material and Ancient Art, ASS’N OF 
ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (Jan. 29, 2013), https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/ 
AAMD%20Guidelines%202013.pdf [http://perma.cc/AZP8-GE5E]. 
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Nazis plundered on a scale unique in modern history and the 
consequences of art displacement continue to be felt today. 
Numerous cases were decided against private collectors,132 
museums,133 and nations.134 One matter, popularized in the 2015 
movie Woman in Gold, follows the legal efforts of Maria Altmann 
to gain ownership of a collection of Gustav Klimt paintings 
owned by her family, looted by the Nazis in Austria during World 
War II, and repatriated to an Austrian museum, where they 
remained on display until Altmann’s successful recovery.135 
Austria held the works under claim of right and Altmann 
successfully brought an action in U.S. courts under the Federal 
Sovereign Immunities Act. The parties eventually settled and the 
works were turned over to Altmann.136 
As Holocaust-era claims were filed against museums 
asserting title to works in their collections (often acquired by gift 
from collector donors), these museum defendants reacted swiftly 
to address the crisis and to right the wrongs. Museums 
acknowledged that holding and displaying stolen goods would be 
antithetical to the public trust mission of the non-profit 
institutions. Museums adopted guidelines for handling and 
resolving claims, undertook research of their collections to 
identify works with gaps in provenance during the “war years” 
(generally acknowledged to be 1933–45), resolved these gaps if 
possible, published such findings, and created easily-accessible 
online search tools to assist those with repatriation claims.137 
On the tax side, the value of art continues to climb, and it is 
not surprising that taxing authorities are increasingly turning 
their attention to art transactions. With mounting pressures 
each year to bring in revenue, state revenue departments are 
being particularly aggressive about enforcing state and local tax 
laws, and art is not an exception, especially in New York State, 
home to some of the world’s most powerful and prestigious 
collectors and galleries. In 2016, headlines were made by New 
York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman’s announcement 
 
 132 See, e.g., Menzel v. List, 246 N.E.2d 742, 745 (N.Y. 1969). 
 133 See, e.g., Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2010); Cassirer 
v. Kingdom of Spain, 580 F.3d 1048, 1064 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 134 See, e.g., Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 974 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 135 WOMAN IN GOLD (BBC Films, 2015). 
 136 See generally Arbitral Award, Altmann, et al. v. Republic of Austria (U.S. v. Austria) 
(Jan. 15, 2006), https://plone.unige.ch/art-adr/cases-affaires/6-klimt-paintings-2013-maria- 
altmann-and-austria/arbitral-award-5-klimt-paintings-maria-v-altmann-and-others-v-republic- 
of-austria-15-january-2004/at_download/file [http://perma.cc/G6A2-5K2F]. 
 137 Report of the AAMD Task Force on the Spoliation of Art during the Nazi/ 
World War II Era (1933–1945), ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS (June 4, 1998), 
https://aamd.org/document/report-of-the-aamd-task-force-on-the-spoliation-of-art-during-
the-nazi/world-war-ii-era. 
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of three high-profile tax settlements with a leading gallery, a 
prominent collector, and an art sales executive.138 The settlements 
surprised many in the art world due to the high-profile nature of 
the targets and the focus on common industry practices such as 
the use of fine art shippers. All three settlements are significant 
as a warning that New York State is watching art transactions 
closely and is interpreting and enforcing its tax laws in an 
aggressive manner.139 
Another area to watch is Section 1031 like-kind exchanges 
involving artwork, which has remained largely unregulated. In 
2016, President Obama presented a budget proposal that would 
exclude art and collectibles as assets eligible for Section 1031 
like-kind exchanges.140 Although the proposed changes to Section 
1031 did not take place, the budget proposal shows that the use 
of tax deferral transactions involving artwork is on the 
government’s radar. It remains to be seen what direction the 
next administrations will take, if any, with respect to Section 
1031 like-kind exchanges involving art. 
IV. WHERE WE ARE GOING 
Changing norms foreshadow many of the changes we can 
expect to see in the future of art law. A dominant theme in this 
 
 138 See Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen., N.Y. State Office of the 
Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $4.28 Million Settlement With 
International Art Dealer Gagosian Gallery for Failure to Collect and Remit New York 
Sales Tax (July 19, 2016), http://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-428-
million-settlement-international-art-dealer-gagosian [http://perma.cc/V49Y-7HGU]; Press 
Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney Gen., N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., 
A.G. Schneiderman Announces Agreement with Art Sales Executive for Repayment of 
Taxes on Artwork Acquisitions (May 3, 2016), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-
schneiderman-announces-agreement-art-sales-executive-re-payment-taxes-artwork 
(referring in the press release which announces a $4.28 million settlement with Gagosian 
Gallery) [http://perma.cc/PG48-ZZWM]; Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney 
Gen., N.Y. State Office of the Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces $7 Million 
Settlement with Art Collector Aby J. Rosen for Failing to Pay Sales and Use Taxes on 
Art Acquisitions (May 3, 2016), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
announces-7-million-settlement-art-collector-aby-j-rosen-failing-pay [hereinafter “Press 
Release, $7 Million Settlement”] [http://perma.cc/VP8Y-WCRN]; Jennifer Smith, Aby 
Rosen Settles Tax-Evasion Inquiry for $7 Million, WALL ST. J. (May 3, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/aby-rosen-settles-tax-evasion-case-for-7-million-1462299474; 
Kelly Crow, Art Dealer Larry Gagosian Settles Over Sales Taxes for $4.3 Million, WALL ST. J. 
(July 19, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/art-dealer-larry-gagosian-settles-over-sales-
taxes-for-4-3-million-1468976952; see also GAGOSIAN, http://www.gagosian.com/contact 
[http://perma.cc/BB3M-TCNF]. 
 139 The tax investigations of the gallery and the collector were made under the New 
York False Claims Act (“FCA”), a law that was amended in 2010 to specifically include tax 
liability. It appears that the FCA, which has a ten-year statute of limitations, was used by 
the Attorney General to impose liability on alleged instances of violation of the New York 
tax laws on the basis of “knowingly” making a “false statement” or “knowingly” filing a 
“false record” on tax returns. See Press Release, $7 Million Settlement, supra note 138. 
 140 OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 
129 (2015). 
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narrative is that the art industry is increasingly becoming a 
global industry. As of 2015, the art market was a $63.8 billion 
global business.141 Sotheby’s and Christie’s, the world’s leading 
fine art auction houses and long-time competitors, have grown into 
multinational art businesses with salerooms in major art centers, 
offices, employees, and representatives in six continents.142 The 
presence and influence of China is increasingly felt in the art 
market. As of 2015, it occupied a close third place, following the 
United Kingdom in its share of the global art market by value, 
and many of its collectors are setting record prices for 
contemporary art at auctions and establishing themselves as 
market players with connections to high-profile galleries, 
museums, and foundations.143 For collectors, dealers, institutions, 
and industry professionals, there are opportunities to transact 
business worldwide and year-round at global art fairs such as 
Art Basel in Switzerland, Miami Beach, and Hong Kong, the 
Armory Show in New York, and the Foire Internationale d’Art 
Contemporain in Paris.144 The top galleries have been aggressively 
expanding their worldwide presence.145 Museums continue to join 
forces with other international museums in traveling exhibitions, 
and are expanding by establishing international locations, most 
notably the Guggenheim, with museums in New York, Venice, 
Bilbao, Abu Dhabi, and Berlin. 
The increasing globalization of art mirrors the global 
expansion of private wealth. Newly wealthy individuals from 
Asia, Russia, Latin America, and the Middle East are interested 
in collecting top contemporary art, living in multiple homes 
around the globe, and exerting influence in the art world, as 
demonstrated by the recent growth in private museums. 
More globalization of private wealth means that planning 
from a multi-jurisdictional perspective is essential for the 
globally-inclined private collector, artist, art gallery, or museum. 
The benefits of cross-border tax and wealth planning are clearly 
 
 141 See Kinsella, supra note 108.  
 142 See Locations, SOTHEBY’S, http://www.sothebys.com/content/sothebys/en/inside/ 
locations-worldwide.html/ [http://perma.cc/GKR9-ALP4]; Salerooms & Offices, CHRISTIE’S, 
http://www.christies.com/locations [http://perma.cc/VB4K-3F6P]. 
 143 See Kinsella, supra note 108. 
 144 Which International Art Fairs Have the Highest Attendance?, ARTNEWS (Feb. 28, 
2015, 9:00 AM), http://www.artnews.com/2015/02/28/which-international-art-fairs-have-
the-largest-attendance/ [http://perma.cc/6H56-VBE6]. 
 145 For example, at the time this Article was published, Gagosian Gallery had sixteen 
locations, see GAGOSIAN, https://www.gagosian.com [http://perma.cc/DE2C-P3CU], Pace 
Gallery had ten locations, see PACE, http://www.pacegallery.com [http://perma.cc/P7MD-49SH], 
David Zwirner Gallery had three locations, see DAVID ZWIRNER, www.davidzwirner.com 
[http://perma.cc/Z8LF-ED4E], and Hauser & Wirth had six locations worldwide, see 
HAUSERWIRTH, http://www.hauserwirth.com/contact/ [http://perma.cc/8TU2-RUE7 ]. 
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evident for high net-worth private collectors having potential 
exposure to multiple taxing regimes and wishing to preserve 
their wealth for future generations. These benefits also extend to 
art galleries with international outposts that must contend with 
tax issues that arise from doing business and deriving income 
internationally, artists who create internationally and maintain 
studios in multiple locations, as well as museums planning 
survival and expansion by cultivating international donors. The 
movement of players in global locations will also continue to 
necessitate sophisticated legal advice in legal disciplines other 
than tax, including immigration, cross-border commercial and 
contract law, import-export law, employment law, and other 
fields as well. 
The art industry is also becoming more of an online industry. 
Like internet start-ups in other industries, online art auction 
businesses are fiercely competing for the attention of a younger 
generation of potential collectors who are social media savvy, 
appreciate efficient and convenient user-experiences, and may even 
prefer the anonymity of an internet transaction in some cases.  
As art continues to increase in value, art transactions will 
increase in sophistication and complexity, with more 
intermediaries in the chain and more art transported across 
multiple jurisdictions. We may see an increase in transactions 
among market players joining forces in transacting together and 
co-investing in artwork. The increasing complexity and dollar 
amounts of transactions will lead to further regulatory responses 
and pave the way for additional developments in the law, whether 
through administrative channels, legislative changes, or litigation. 
A fascinating aspect of the growth of the art industry is how 
the players’ behaviors are evolving in response to market and 
regulatory forces. On one hand, the art industry has been 
strongly self-regulated. Appraisal organizations such as The 
Appraisal Foundation have established and are implementing 
the standards of professional appraisal practice, such as the 
Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.146 Codes of 
ethics have been established for the art trade, and are applicable 
to members of the Association of Professional Art Advisors and 
the Art Dealers Association of America.147 Museums are 
regulated by codes of ethics of the International Council of 
Museums (“ICOM”), the Association of Art Museum Directors 
 
 146 See THE APPRAISAL FOUND., 2016–2017 UNIFORM STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL 
APPRAISAL PRACTICE 6, 8 (2016).  
 147 See THE ASS’N OF PROF. ART ADVISORS, http://www.artadvisors.org/ [http://perma.cc/ 
6VQB-E2NG]. 
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(“AAMD”), and the American Alliance of Museums (“AAM”).148 
The Art Loss Register maintains the world’s largest database of 
stolen art, allowing potential buyers to perform due diligence and 
protect themselves against the risk of bad title.149 On the other 
hand, industry players are increasingly wearing multiple hats 
and these interrelated roles can raise questions. For example, 
ventures such as art dealers putting on museum-quality 
exhibitions, collectors and art dealers co-partnering on 
investments, artists and auction platforms collaborating on sales, 
and museums collaborating with commercial sponsors can 
confuse the traditional roles of these discrete art fields. 
Navigating legal and ethical waters in these various roles will 
continue to present new and interesting challenges.  
The field of art-specific education will continue to see growth. 
There are now advanced university degrees and diplomas from 
commercial arts institutes such as the Sotheby’s Institute of 
Art being offered in art business management.150 Coursework 
includes art law, marketing and strategy, finance and accounting, 
valuation, collection management, art criticism, and curating. It 
can be expected that this professionalization of the field will yield 
standards and best practices in the future. 
Growth will continue. It is undisputed that the internet and 
cheap transportation have aided the globalization of art 
production and engagement with art. In addition, increased 
political awareness could fuel numerous claims for repatriation of 
cultural property against museums, collectors, and market nations. 
This globalization of market players—creators, purchasers, 
suppliers, and advisors—will grow in scale and complexity. In 
addition to the international commercial law aspects of these 
market transactions, these activities will touch on international 
intellectual property, immigration, and other international areas 
of practice.  
It is fitting to end this Section with “the art” itself, and it is 
fair to say that the nature of art is changing. Apart from the 
market, i.e. the trade in art, the production of art presents new 
dimensions and new challenges, especially with the growth of 
technological innovation. The twentieth century blurred the 
distinction between high art and popular culture, and it is likely 
that the art of the twenty-first century will combine, recombine, 
 
 148 See Codes of Ethics, ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS, https://www.aamd.org/about/ 
code-of-ethics [http://perma.cc/3A9S-CJA9]; AM. ALLIANCE OF MUSEUMS, www.aam-us.org 
[http://perma.cc/4GWD-WJ25]. 
 149 See THE ART LOSS REG., http://www.artloss.com/en [http://perma.cc/JC8B-B6SN]. 
 150 See Master’s Programs in London, New York, and Los Angeles, SOTHEBY’S INST. OF 
ART, http://www.sothebysinstitute.com/masters-programs/ [http://perma.cc/U7LM-BEJL]. 
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and interconnect in new and unexpected ways. Driven by 
social media, art is coming to be participative, interactive, 
multi-disciplinary, and accretive. Engaging and entertaining 
large scale (and often temporary) works such as 3D illusions and 
light installations, or computer-generated works employing 
virtual reality or artificial intelligence, raise a host of legal 
questions—who is the author of these immersive multi-creator 
works?; how are these works credited?; how are they registered 
for copyright protection?; how are they recorded and archived?; 
can these works be restored and recreated? In addition, the 
marketplace will ask how this art can be owned, appraised, 
and valued.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Looking back, art law has made remarkable strides in 
providing a foundation and structure for the governing rules and 
norms in this fast-paced industry, one which has evolved into a 
multi-billion dollar global business. Still a young field, art law is 
changing rapidly in response to the increased scope, depth, and 
complexity of a global, interconnected art world. Such trends as 
the astronomical rise in the value of artwork, mega-galleries, 
increasing numbers of new entrants to the market, new 
technologies, and new ways of interacting with art, all point to 
the future of art law. 
Looking forward, art law is certain to continue developing as 
a dynamic and exciting field that demands deep and wide 
expertise from its practitioners. With higher values comes more 
risk to financial investments in valuable art. Risk is not limited 
solely to financial aspects; collectors, dealers, advisors, 
appraisers, artists, and museums all operate in an environment 
which is ripe for increased regulation, new commercial disputes, 
and changing ethical norms. The well-rounded art lawyer will 
enjoy a role in the business of art and will be rewarded by 
helping to shape and navigate the anticipated responses to 
these changes. 
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